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Our paper presents a new rationale for innovation by incumbents. We show that the
possibility to price-discriminate between consumers having diﬀerent levels of wealth
is a suﬃcient incentive for the industry leader to overcome the Arrow (1962) eﬀect
and keep investing in R&D, even in the absence of any incumbent advantage in the
R&D ﬁeld. We model an economy composed of two distinct groups of consumers,
diﬀering in their wealth endowment and subject to non-homothetic preferences, ob-
tained through unit consumption of the quality good. We demonstrate that in such
a framework, there exists a unique steady state equilibrium with positive innovation
rates of both incumbents and challengers. Beyond its novelty, this result then also al-
lows us to analyze the eﬀect of the extent of income inequalities on both the challenger
and incumbent innovation rates, and by extension on the economic growth rate. We
demonstrate that a higher share of the population being poor is detrimental to the
rate of economic growth, while a redistribution of wealth from rich to poor consumers
increases the challenger innovation rate and has ambiguous eﬀects on the incumbent’s
investment in R&D.
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11 Introduction
In the ﬁrst-generation quality-ladder models (Segerstrom et al., 1990; Grossman and
Helpman, 1991b; Aghion and Howitt, 1992), quality leaders do not participate to the next
innovation race. This absence of R&D investment by incumbents, known as the Arrow
(1962) eﬀect and justiﬁed by the fact that innovating quality leaders would only canni-
balize their own business, is at odds with overwhelming evidence of leading ﬁrms still
signiﬁcantly investing in R&D.1 Acknowledging the counterfactual nature of innovation
races leaving out the current quality leaders, a growing literature has hence developed
models of Schumpeterian growth featuring innovation by incumbents. Several mechanisms
have been used to overcome the Arrow (1962) eﬀect and explain a positive investment
in R&D by quality leaders. Cozzi (2007) has shown that in the particular case of con-
stant returns at the ﬁrm level, the incumbent is indiﬀerent to its own R&D investment.
Segerstrom and Zolnierek (1999) as well as Segerstrom (2007) introduce R&D cost ad-
vantages for the incumbents stemming from the expertise granted by quality leadership,
while Etro (2004, 2008) and Aghion et al. (2001) feature leaders investing in R&D in order
to escape competition pressure, whether it be in the innovative ﬁeld or on the product
market.2
This paper introduces a new rationale for investment in R&D by incumbents, based on
another stylized fact usually overlooked in standard quality ladder models: all the quality
leaders in high-tech sectors do not only invest positive and signiﬁcant amounts in R&D, but
also produce and sell more than one quality-diﬀerentiated version of their core products.
Indeed, Intel currently sells three diﬀerent families of microprocessors (Core, Pentium and
Celeron), displaying diﬀerent levels of speed and performance; Microsoft commercializes si-
multaneously Windows XP, Vista and 7; Nokia sells numerous quality-diﬀerentiated mobile
phones, displaying signiﬁcant variations in oﬀered functionalities. This feature has so far
been ignored by standard quality-ladder models, where homothetic preferences drive the
result that only the version of the quality good displaying the highest price-adjusted quality
is consumed at the equilibrium. However, the opportunity to oﬀer diﬀerent price-quality
bundles in order to discriminate between consumers having diﬀerent quality valuations
represents a signiﬁcant incentive for the leading-edge ﬁrms to invest in R&D in order to
expand their product range. Hence, while so far the incentives for innovation by quality
leaders have been argued to be mainly on the supply side (R&D cost advantages, Stackel-
berg leadership), this paper provides a product-driven incentive for investment in R&D by
incumbents.
Our modeling framework builds on models of endogenous growth such as the ones of
Li (2003), Zweimuller and Brunner (2005) or Zweimuller and Foellmi (2006), all allowing
for more than one quality to be consumed at the equilibrium through diﬀerences in wealth
endowment and non-homothetic preferences. By contrast, in the standard quality-ladder
models (Grossman and Helpman, 1991a; Segerstrom et al., 1990), the quality good is
divisible and the preferences of the consumers are homothetic, meaning that only the
1Segerstrom (2007) presents R&D expenditures of selected industry leaders for the year 2000, with a
net sales to R&D investment ratio going as high as 11.5% for Intel or 16.4% for Microsoft.
2Etro (2004, 2008) models sequential patent races where the incumbents, acting as Stackelberg leaders,
are given the opportunity to make a strategic precommitment to a given level of R&D investment: quality
leaders have then an incentive to invest in order to escape the innovative pressure of outsiders. Product
market competition drives the results of Aghion et al. (2001), where the perspective to lessen the com-
petition pressure (and broaden the market share) provides the incentive for the incumbent to carry out
positive R&D investments.highest price-adjusted quality will be consumed at the equilibrium, even when diﬀerences
in wealth endowments are allowed for: the poorest consumers will only consume a lower
share of the top quality good. Our framework on the contrary allows for the level of
a consumer’s income to determine his willingness to pay for the highest quality,3 this
property being obtained through unit consumption of the quality good while the rest of
the expenditures are spent on a standard (composite) good. The economy is composed
of two distinct groups of consumers, diﬀering in their wealth endowment. This feature,
associated to non-homothetic preferences, yields diﬀerent possible market structures for the
quality good at the equilibrium, depending on the extent of inequalities in the distribution
of wealth.
In models displaying this feature but without allowing for innovation by incumbents
(Zweimuller and Brunner, 2005), the successful innovator was always a challenger before
winning the R&D race, and has at its disposal a unique quality level: we then have either
a monopoly with the quality leader capturing the whole market, or a duopoly with the
producers of the ﬁrst- and the second-best qualities sharing the market. The quality
leader is the one that decides the market structure that is optimal for him and then sets
the adequate price, depending on the wealth distribution within the economy. Hence,
in those models, whether or not the second-best quality is being sold is once and for all
deterministically determined by the extent of inequalities in the economy, and the successive
quality jumps never change the market structure. In our model allowing for innovation by
incumbent, a third case is possible: the last innovation race has been won by the incumbent,
who has then successfully innovated twice in a row. The quality leader then has at its
disposal two successive quality levels, and faces a monopoly price discrimination problem
(Mussa and Rosen, 1978): he will then always optimally choose to oﬀer two diﬀerent price-
quality bundles. Hence, in our model, the equilibrium market structure and the number of
active producers do depend on the outcome of the successive innovation races, and can be
considered as a stochastic process.4 In such a framework, we then model R&D races with
decreasing marginal productivity of R&D investment, and show that without any R&D
cost advantages, the incumbent still has an incentive to invest in R&D, stemming from the
increment between the proﬁts realized when price discrimination is possible and the ones
realized when selling the same quality to everybody.
In order to thoroughly analyze the steady state of the deﬁned model, we then ﬁrst
restrict ourselves to the case of a monopoly market structure for the quality good in the
case the innovation race has been won by a challenger.5 We demonstrate the existence
under certain parametric conditions of an interior solution for the steady-state equilibrium
with positive R&D investment by the incumbent in the next innovative race. This result,
beyond its novelty, enables us to then study the eﬀects of income inequalities on innova-
tions rates of both challengers and incumbents, as well as on the economy growth rate.
We show that a growing part of the population being poor is always detrimental to both
innovation rates, while redistribution of income from rich to poor people is beneﬁc to the
3We choose to model diﬀerent levels of preferences for the highest quality through diﬀerences in endow-
ment rather than diﬀerences in quality valuation in order to be able to introduce the problematic of the
eﬀects of inequality.
4As it will be demonstrated, the presence of such a stochastic process does however not prevent us from
proceeding to a steady state analysis, since we demonstrate it to be a Markov process with a stationary
distribution.
5Indeed, our aim is to ﬁrst clearly isolate the incentive for the monopolist to engage in the next R&D
race stemming from the perspective of possible price discrimination. A wealth distribution resulting in a
duopoly market structure in the case a challenger has won the R&D race adds a further incentive for the
incumbent to invest in R&D, i.e. to escape competition along the lines of the Aghion et al. (2001) model.
2innovation by challengers rate, and has ambiguous eﬀects on the innovation by incumbent
rate. We then ﬁnally deﬁne the steady state equilibrium for the cases where the distribu-
tion of wealth induces a duopoly market structure in the case the latest innovation race
has been won by a challenger, and show that this case occurs rarely when allowing for
innovation by incumbent.
As already mentioned, our paper is related to the literature studying the eﬀects of
inequalities in the product market on growth (Zweimuller, 2000; Li, 2003; Zweimuller and
Brunner, 2005; Zweimuller and Foellmi, 2006). Those models use the feature of non-
homothetic preferences and more than one quality being consumed to study the impact of
income inequality on the equilibrium market structure (i.e. the number of price-competing
producers of diﬀerent qualities with positive market share) and by extension on the rate
of economic growth.6 However, our paper strongly diﬀers from the latter by allowing for
innovation by incumbent: in that case, beyond the determination of the market structure,
consumption of more than one quality at the equilibrium also represents an opportunity for
a monopolist to price-discriminate between consumers having diﬀerent tastes for quality (in
our framework, because of diﬀerences in levels of income). Our model hence also relates to
the monopoly price discrimination literature (Salop and Stiglitz, 1977; Mussa and Rosen,
1978; Stokey, 1979). Finally, our paper is also obviously part of the growing body of liter-
ature concerning innovation by incumbents (Aghion et al., 2001; Cozzi, 2007; Segerstrom,
2007; Etro, 2004, 2008). It is however to the best of our knowledge the ﬁrst one to model
a product-driven, price-discrimination incentive for innovation by incumbents. Beyond its
novelty, this approach also makes it possible to study the eﬀects of income inequalities on
the innovation by incumbents rate, and by extension on the global growth rate.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 to 4 present our model, while
section 5 studies the steady state equilibrium. Section 6 then studies the eﬀects of the
extent of inequalities on the innovation rates and economic growth rate. Section 7 ﬁnally
studies the properties of the equilibrium in the case a duopoly occurs when the successful
innovator is a challenger. Section 8 concludes.
2 Consumers
There is a ﬁxed number L of consumers that live inﬁnitely and supply one unit of
labor each period, paid at a constant wage w. While all consumers have the same wage
income, they are assumed to diﬀer with respect to asset ownership ωi(t): along Zweimuller
and Brunner (2005), we assume a two-class society with rich (R) and poor (P) consumers,
being distinguished by their wealth (respectively ωR and ωP).
The share of poor consumers within the population is denoted by β. The extent of
inequalities within the economy is determined by this share, as well as by the repartition
between rich and poor of the aggregate wealth Ω. d ∈ (0,1) is deﬁned as the ratio of
the value of assets owned by a poor consumer relative to the average per-capita wealth:
d = ωP
Ω/L. Given d, the wealth position of the rich can be computed as dR =
1−βd
1−β . We
hence have ωP = dΩ





6Their analysis of the market structure at the equilibrium is then based on the static, partial equilibrium
literature of price competition between quality-diﬀerentiated goods (Gabszewicz and Thisse, 1979; Shaked
and Sutton, 1982).
3Current income yi(t) of an individual belonging to the group i (i = P,R) is then of the
form:
yi(t) = w + rωi(t) (1)
with r being the interest rate.
Current income is then spent for the consumption of a single unit of a quality good
with price pi(t) (depending on the quality qi(t) chosen by the consumer at time t), and
of ci(t) units of a standardized good with price 1. Preferences are non-homothetic, with
the instantaneous utility of a consumer of type i being described by the following utility
function:
ui(t) = lnci(t) + lnqi(t) = ln(yi(t) − pi(t)) + lnqi(t) (2)
As shown by Zweimuller and Brunner (2005), at time τ the intertemporal decision















with ρ being the rate of time preference. Given an expected time path for both the
interest rate r(t) and the relation between quality and price pi(t,qi(t)), it is then possible
to determine the optimal time path of ci(t), the consumption of the standardized good,
and of qi(t), the chosen quality of the unit consumption good.
For any given time path of expenditures for the quality good pi(t,qi(t)) that does
not exhaust life-time resources, the optimal path of consumption expenditures on the




= r(t) − ρ (3)
The optimal time path of qi(t), on the other hand, cannot be characterized by a diﬀer-
ential equation, since the quality choice is discrete. We notice however that the choice in
qi(t) is made simultaneously along with the decision on pi(t) by proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrms.
We hence set aside the choice of quality on the part of consumers until having deﬁned the
market and price structure for the quality good.
3 Market structure and pricing
There is a linear technology for the production of the standardized good, with labor as
the unit input. We use the price of this standardized good as the numeraire, and since the
market is assumed to be competitive, unit labor input is 1/w.
The market for the quality good is non-competitive. At any date t, we assume that a
continuum of qualities qj(t), j = 0,−1,−2,... exist and can be produced, with q0(t) being
the best quality, q−1(t) the second-best, etc. Labor is the only input, with constant unit
labor requirement a < 1.7 Two successive quality levels diﬀer by a ﬁxed factor k > 1:
7Given the fact we have unit consumption of the quality good, a necessarily has to be inferior to 1.
4qj(t) = k.qj−1(t).
We will now deﬁne more precisely the structure of the quality good market. The
quality good being characterized by unit consumption and ﬁxed quality increments, ﬁrms
use prices as strategic variables. We assume they know the shares of groups P and R
in the population, the respective incomes yR and yP as well as the preferences of the
consumers, but that they cannot distinguish individuals by income. In order to describe
the strategic decisions operated by ﬁrms, we now deﬁne pT
i,{j,j−m}, the “threshold” price
for which a consumer belonging to group i is indiﬀerent between quality j and quality
j − m, i.e. ln(yi − pT
i,{j,j−m}) + lnqj = ln(yi − pj−m) + lnqj−m. Considering the fact that
qj = kj−mqj−m, solving for pT











i,{j,j−m} is the maximum price that the ﬁrm selling the quality j can charge to
a consumer belonging to the group i in order to have a positive market share, when facing
the ﬁrm selling quality j − m. As one can see, this threshold price depends on the income
yi of consumer i, as well as on the price charged by the competitor pj−m. Having deﬁned
this threshold price, and along with Zweimuller and Brunner (2005), we can state:
Lemma 1: If pj ≥ wa holds for the price of some quality qj, j = −1,−2,..., then for the
producer of the any higher quality qj+m, 1 ≤ m ≤ −j, there exists a price pj+m > wa, such
that any consumer prefers quality qj+m to qj.







km is a weighted average
of yi and pj. Given the fact that only prices being below their income are taken into account
by consumers i, we have that pj < yi, and we can hence conclude that pT
j+m,j > pj. Hence,
it is always possible for the producer of the quality j + m to set a price pj+m > pj ≥ wa
such that pj+m ≤ pT
i,{j+m,j}, i.e. such that quality qj+m is preferred to quality qj by the
consumers of group i. This ends the proof. ￿
Hence, if we take for granted that a producer never sells its quality at a price below the
unit production cost wa, it is always possible for the producer of a higher quality to drive
him out of the market, while still making strictly positive proﬁts. Along this result, any
ﬁrm entering the market with a new highest quality q0 has to consider the following trade-
oﬀ concerning the pricing of its product: setting the highest possible price for any given
group of clientele, vs. lowering its price in order to capture a further group of consumers.
It is then possible to show that in an economy characterized by two distinct groups of
consumers (R and P), the equilibrium has the following properties:
Lemma 2: At equilibrium,
(1) The highest quality is produced,
(2) At most the two highest qualities q0 and q−1 are actually produced,
(3) The equilibrium price p−1 fulﬁlls wa ≤ p−1 ≤ pT
P,{−1,−2}, with pT
P,{−1,−2} denoting the
maximum price the producer of the q−1 quality can set in order to deter the producer of the
q−2 quality from entry.
5The proof is made in Zweimuller and Brunner (2005). The intuition is that since there
are only two distinct groups of consumers, at most two distinct qualities can be sold, and
at least one is always consumed, since it is assumed every individual buys one unit of the
quality good. By Lemma 1, higher qualities drive out lower ones, hence the two qualities
being still possibly active are q0 and q−1. At equilibrium, no ﬁrm can make a loss, hence
the price pj being charged for any quality qj active on the market is necessarily superior
or equal to the production cost wa. Finally, p−1 ≤ pT
P,{−1,−2} follows from the fact that
otherwise the producer of quality q−2 could enter the market.
As it can be seen from lemma 2, two diﬀerent situations are possible for the equilibrium
market structure and associated prices: either only the top quality good q0 is sold to both
groups of consumers (groups P and R), or the top quality good is sold only to the rich
consumers (group R) while the second best quality good is sold to the poor consumers
(group P). Lemma 1 shows that the decision regarding the market structure belongs to the
producer having at its disposal the highest quality q0, considering that he is always able
to set a price that will drive its competitors out.
In Zweimuller and Brunner (2005), as well as other models studying the eﬀects of
inequality on growth through the product market (Zweimuller, 2000; Li, 2003; Zweimuller
and Foellmi, 2006), when the second-best quality is sold on the market, it is produced
by a producer distinct from the producer of the top quality. Indeed, in those models the
incumbent does not engage in the next R&D race: when a new innovation occurs, the
successful challenger becomes the quality leader, the previous quality leader becomes the
producer of the second-best quality (whether he is still active or not depends on the pricing
decision taken by the new quality leader), while the producer of the previous second-best
quality is anyway driven out of the market. These papers hence bear a close relationship
with the static models of price competition in oligopoly markets where consumers buy a
single unit of a given quality good (Gabszewicz and Thisse, 1980; Shaked and Sutton, 1982,
1983). In this case, whether or not the second-best quality is being sold is solely determined
by the distribution of income in the considered economy, since the latter determines the
optimal pricing chosen by the quality leader. In other words, the equilibrium market
structure in those models is set once and for all depending on the values assigned to the
parameters β and d, and the successive quality jumps do not alter it in any way.
In our model however, a further possibility has to be taken into account: it is possible
that a unique producer does have at its disposal the two highest qualities, since we leave
the opportunity for the incumbent to still engage in R&D races. In the case the incumbent
does innovate, he then faces the monopoly pricing problem of a ﬁrm having at its disposal
a spectrum of quality-diﬀerentiated goods (Mussa and Rosen, 1978).
Hence, in our model, the equilibrium market structure does depend on the outcome
of the successive innovation races. In other words, the equilibrium market structure is
a random process that we denote by M(t). We deﬁne the state space of this stochastic
process as {(SC),(SI)}, with the possible states (SC) and (SI) being characterized in the
following way:8
• “Successful Challenger” (SC) state: a challenger is the winner of the last R&D
race, i.e. the new quality leader is diﬀerent from the former quality leader. The new
8As it will be further demonstrated, the stochastic process M(t) is a continuous time Markov process
for which it will be possible to determine a stationary distribution.
6quality leader then only has the highest quality at its disposal. One or two qualities
can then be sold on the market, depending on the pricing strategy chosen by the new
quality leader (which will itself depend on the wealth distribution in the economy).
The market structure can then either be a monopoly (only quality q0 is sold), with the
new quality leader charging a price that enables him to capture the whole market, or
a duopoly (both qualities q0 and q−1 are sold), with the new quality leader charging
a higher price and serving only the upper part of the market, leaving the lower part
to the second-best quality producer.9
• “Successful Incumbent” (SI) state: the former quality leader, still carrying out
R&D, is the winner of the last R&D race, and hence has two successive qualities
at its disposal. According to lemma 2, the market structure is then necessarily a
monopoly. However, as we will show, the quality leader will then oﬀer two diﬀerent
quality/price bundles in order to discriminate between the groups P and R of the
population (Mussa and Rosen, 1978), and hence both qualities q0 and q−1 are sold.
We will now describe in more details the possible market structures, prices and associ-
ated proﬁts in the two existing states.
3.1 (SC) state
As already stated, the market structure in the (SC) state is deterministically either a
monopoly or a duopoly, depending on the extent of inequalities in wealth distribution in
the economy.
3.1.1 Monopoly case
It corresponds to the case where the wealth structure makes it optimal for the quality
leader to set a price enabling him to sell the unique quality he has at its disposal to the
entire market, driving the former quality leader out of the market.
pT
i,{0,−1} is the maximum price the producer of quality q0 can set in order to capture
the consumers of the group i for a given price p−1 of quality q−1. Hence, optimal price
chosen by a quality leader willing to capture the whole market is pT
P,{0,−1}, given that the
producer of quality q−1 engages in marginal cost pricing (i.e. q−1 = wa). Indeed, setting
a price that captures the consumers belonging to the group P automatically ensures that
the rich consumers will consume the highest quality q0 too.
We denote by pM the price being charged in the monopoly case of the “successful








with the associated proﬁts:
πM = L(pM − wa)
yP
M being the income of the poor consumers in the monopoly case of the (SC) state, of the
form yP
M = w + rdΩM
L .
9It is important to notice that though either a monopoly or a duopoly, the market structure inside the
(SC) case is not a stochastic process: for given values of the parameters β and d, it is deterministically
determined.
73.1.2 Duopoly case
It corresponds to the case where the wealth structure makes it optimal for the new
quality leader to set a price capturing only the upper part of the market, abandoning the
lower part to the producer of the second-best quality. The two highest qualities q0 and q−1
are then sold at the equilibrium, being produced by two diﬀerent ﬁrms.
Zweimuller and Brunner (2005) have deﬁned a possible equilibrium in that case, under
the condition on the punishment strategies of the inﬁnitely repeated pricing game that
no ﬁrm is punished if it changes its price without aﬀecting the other ﬁrm’s proﬁt (Proof:
cf Zweimuller and Brunner (2005), p. 242). At this equilibrium, the new quality leader
will charge the highest possible price enabling him to capture the group of rich consumers
pT
R,{0,−1}, given the expected strategy of the producer of the second-best quality. The
former quality leader charges the highest possible price enabling him to capture the poor
group of consumers pT
P,{−1,−2}, given that the producer of quality q−2 engages in marginal
cost pricing. It is however important to notice that this strategy, chosen by the producer
of quality q−1, is only made possible because of the decision of the new quality leader to
charge a higher price, capturing only the upper part of the market. Hence, as already
previously stated, the quality leader’s optimal decision, depending itself on the wealth dis-
tribution of the economy, always plays the decisive role in determining the market structure.
We call pR
D the price being charged to the rich consumers in the duopoly case of the
(SC) state, while pP





















with the associated proﬁts πR
D for the quality leader and πP
D for the producer of the second-
best quality:
πR
D = (1 − β)(pR





D being of the form:
yP









Having deﬁned πM (proﬁts of the quality leader in the monopoly case of the (SC)
state) and πR
D (proﬁts of the quality leader in the duopoly case of the (SC) state), we can
now clearly state the criteria governing the quality leader’s decision concerning its pricing
strategy in the (SC) state. Indeed, as already stated, the current quality leader plays
the decisive role in the determination of the market structure, and takes his decision by
comparing the generated proﬁts in both cases, i.e. πM and πR
D. If πR
D < πM, the leader
will choose to be the only ﬁrm active on the market, and will charge the price pM that
captures the two populations. Otherwise, the leader will leave the lower part of the market
to the follower, charging the higher price pR
D. Even if a fully analytical characterization
of the parametric cases for which each situation occurs is not possible,10 we can still state
that the monopoly case occurs when the two groups are suﬃciently similar to each other:
d suﬃciently close to 1, and β suﬃciently large.
10Indeed, in order to determine the optimal price strategy, ﬁrms have to determine the endowments ωR
and ωP in each regime, which in turn depend on the endogenous equilibrium value of overall wealth Ωs in
the two cases.
83.2 (SI) state
Two qualities are systematically sold in the (SI) state. Indeed, a leader having at its
disposal two successive qualities and facing two groups of consumers having diﬀerent levels
of income will always ﬁnd it optimal to oﬀer two distinct price-quality bundles in order to
maximize its proﬁt (Mussa and Rosen, 1978). The market structure is then a monopoly.
The price charged by the monopolist for its second-best quality will be the maximal price
enabling him to capture the poor group of consumers pT
P,{−1,−2}, given that the producer
of quality q−2 engages in marginal cost pricing. The price charged for the highest quality




I the price being charged to the rich consumers in the (SI) state, while pP
I is




















with the associated proﬁts for the discriminating monopolist:
πI = βL(pP




I being of the form:
yP









We hence notice that the prices charged for the two qualities in the duopoly case of the
(SC) state and in the (SI) state are strongly similar, even if the number of active ﬁrms are
diﬀerent. However, the overall wealth (Ωs, s ∈ (D,I)) is diﬀerent depending on the state
the economy ﬁnds itself in, hence making it necessary to clearly diﬀerentiate the prices
charged in the two possible cases in which 2 qualities are sold.
Having deﬁned the possible market structure, prices and proﬁts in every possible state,
we can now move to the description of the R&D process, which is the engine of growth in
our model. It is however important to signal right away that for the sake of clarity, we will
restrict ourselves to the case where the market structure in the (SC) state is a monopoly
in the following sections. We will study the duopoly case in the last section of the paper.
4 R&D sector
Firms carry out R&D in order to discover the next quality level. Two types of ﬁrms
engage in R&D races: the current quality leader (incumbent), and followers (challengers).
There is free entry for follower ﬁrms, and each one of them has access to the same R&D
technology. Innovations are random, and occur for a given ﬁrm i according to a Poisson
process of hazard rate φi. Labor is the only input, and we assume decreasing returns to
R&D at the ﬁrm level, with the R&D cost function ψ(φi) being an increasing and convex
function of R&D intensity φi.
In order to have an immediate probability of innovating of φM, the incumbent needs to
hire Fφα
M labor units, with α > 1. As for followers, we assume along with Segerstrom and
Zolnierek (1999) that in order to have an immediate probability of innovating of φCi, a chal-
lenger needs to hire Fφα
Cimα−1 labor units, with m being the number of ﬁrms entering the
R&D race. We then have the global probability of a challenger to discover the next quality
9being φC = mφCi and the amount of labor hired being m(Fφα
Cimα−1) = F(mφCi)α = Fφα
C.
Investment decisions in R&D are taken considering the associated costs and rewards in
the case of a successful innovation. The reward accruing to a successful challenger in the
(SC) state depends on the optimal market structure chosen by the new leader, that itself
depends on the distribution of wealth within the economy. As already signaled, in this ﬁrst
part of our paper, where we clearly want to isolate the incentive for incumbents to invest
in R&D being linked to the possibility for them to discriminate between diﬀerent groups
of consumers, we will focus on the case where we have a monopoly market structure in
the (SC) state. Indeed, in the case where we have a duopoly market structure, one could
identify a further incentive for the incumbent to innovate along the line of the Aghion et al.
(2001) model, i.e. to escape the competitive pressure applied by the producer of quality q−1.
We deﬁne vM as the expected present value of a quality leader having innovated once
((SC) state), and vI as the expected present value of a quality leader having innovated
twice, and hence having at its disposal two successive qualities ((SI) state). vCM,i and
vCI,i are the corresponding expected present values of a challenger ﬁrm i, both in the
(SC) and (SI) state. Free entry in the R&D races implies that we focus on the limit case
where m = ∞, and that the individual contribution of any particular follower ﬁrm i to the
aggregate challenger innovation rate is negligible: hence, we have vCM,i = vCI,i = 0. The
free entry condition in the R&D race further imposes the traditional equality constraint
between expected proﬁts and engaged costs for the challengers, both in states (SC) and









Hence, considering equation (7) we get the result that φCM and φCI are equal. This
stems from the fact that the expected reward vM for a challenger that innovates is the
same, whether you are in state (SC) or in state (SI). Hence, from now on we will consider
that φCM = φCI = φC.
The incumbent on the other hand participates to the race with the advantage of having
already innovated at least once, and hence being the current producer of the leading quality.
It is hence not subject to the free entry constraint of equality between engaged costs





M + φM(vI − vM) + φC(vCM,i − vM)} (8)
The incumbent in the (SC) state earns the monopoly proﬁts πM (since we are restricting
ourselves to the monopoly case), and incurs the R&D costs wFφα
M. With instantaneous
probability φM, the leader innovates once more, and its value jumps up to vI. The economy
then jumps to the state (SI), and two qualities start to be produced. However, with over-
all instantaneous probability φC, some R&D challenger innovates, and the quality leader
10becomes an R&D follower: its value falls to vCM,i = 0. The economy then remains in the
state (SC), and only one quality is produced.




I + φI(vI − vI) + φC(vCM,i − vI)} (9)
The incumbent in the (SI) state earns the proﬁts πI of a monopolist being able to
discriminate between rich and poor consumers by oﬀering two distinct price/quantity bun-
dles. He incurs the R&D costs wFφα
I . With instantaneous probability φI, the incumbent
innovates once more, in which case its value remains vI, since we have established with
Lemma 2 that at most two successive quantities are sold at equilibrium. Hence, the in-
cumbent will still be the producer of the two qualities being sold, but he will drive himself
out of the market for the former quality q−1, that has become quality q−2 with the latest
quality jump. The economy then remains in state (SI). With instantaneous probability
φC, some R&D follower innovates, and the quality leader then falls back to being an R&D
challenger: its value falls to vCM,i = 0. The economy then jumps to the state (SC), and
only the new highest quality is sold.
In both states, the incumbent ﬁrm chooses its R&D eﬀort so as to maximize the right-
hand side of its Bellman equation. Using the fact that vCM,i = vCI,i = 0, (8) and (9) then
yield the following ﬁrst order conditions:
vI − vM = αwFφα−1
M (10)
−αwFφα−1
I = 0 ⇒ φI = 0 (11)
Hence, we obtain a relation between the R&D eﬀort and the incremental value that
would result from innovating in both states. Given that the incremental value of a further
innovation for an incumbent in the (SI) state is null in our benchmark case of an economy
with only two distinct population groups, we obtain that the optimal investment in R&D
in that state is zero.11
Using the optimality constraints (10) and (11) in (8) and (9), we obtain the following
expressions for the expected values vM and vI:
vM =








The right-hand side of equation (12) deserves particular attention. Indeed, the expected
value vM is not only composed of the actualized proﬁts
πM
r+φC, but also of a second term
(α−1)wFφα
M
r+φC . This term represents a kind of second reward (beyond the realized proﬁts)
when becoming the quality leader: you gain access to the possibility of innovating for a
11It would of course be possible to generalize the result to more than two groups of population, and even
a continuum of quality valuations as in Mussa and Rosen (1978). We believe the incumbent would then
keep investing in R&D beyond the second innovation in a row.
11second time in a row, and hence of becoming a discriminating monopolist. It represents
the actualized possible gains of entering the “private” R&D race reserved to the quality
leader (the entry cost being the requirement of having already innovated once).
5 Steady state equilibrium
5.1 Labor market equilibrium
We have two possible equations describing the equilibrium on the labor market, whether
we are in the (SC) or the (SI) state. The equilibrium on the labor market in the (SC) state
is of the form:
L = Fφα
M + Fφα
C + aL + (L/w)(β(yP
M − pM) + (1 − β)(yR
M − pM)) (14)
with φM + φC being the number of people hired in the R&D sector, aL being the
number of people hired for the production of the quality goods (we know there is unit
consumption of each of them), and ﬁnally L/w(β(yP
M − pM) + (1 − β)(yR
M − pM)) being
the number of people devoted to the production of the standardized good.
The equilibrium on the labor market in the (SI) state is of the form:
L = Fφα
C + aL + (L/w)(β(yP
I − pP
I ) + (1 − β)(yR
I − pR
I )) (15)
with φC being the number of people hired in the R&D sector (the incumbent does not
invest in R&D in the (SI) state), aL being the number of people hired for the production




I )) being the number of
people devoted to the production of the standardized good.
It will prove convenient to express (14) and (15) in terms of proﬁt ﬂows in both states,





by their values expressed in Section 3, (14) and (15) yield:
wL = wFφα
C + wFφα
M + waL + L(β(w + rd
ΩM
L


















Splitting waL into βwaL + (1 − β)waL and rearranging terms, we ﬁnally obtain the
following two equations deﬁning labor equilibrium in both states:
wFφα
M + wFφα
C = πM − rΩM (16)
wFφα
C = πI − rΩI (17)
5.2 Steady state analysis
In order to be able to proceed to a steady state analysis, we need to prove the existence
(and, if possible, uniqueness) of a stationary distribution for the stochastic process M(t),
i.e. for the stochastic equilibrium market structure.
12Proposition 1: The market structure M(t) is a Markov process with state space {(SC),(SI)},





, and transition probability matrix P(∆t) =
I + Q∆t.
Proof: The continuous stochastic process M(t) satisﬁes the Markov property:
P(M(t + ∆t) = k|M(t) = j,M(ti) = xi∀i) = P(M(t + ∆t) = k|M(t) = j)
with k,j ∈ {(SC),(SI)}, t0 < t1 < ... < tn < t and x0,...,xn ∈ {(SC),(SI)}. Indeed, the
current state of the market structure M(t) contains all the information that is needed to
characterize the future stochastic behavior of the process: at a given time t, we only need
to know the realization of the random variable M(t) to be able to compute the probabilities
associated to the possible realizations of M(t + ∆t). We deﬁne as qi,j the probability per
time unit that the system makes a transition from state i to state j:
qi,j = lim
∆t→0
P(M(t + ∆t) = j|M(t) = i)
∆t
Considering the R&D races described in our model, we have qSC,SI = φM and qSI,SC = φC.
Indeed, φM corresponds to the immediate probability for the incumbent to innovate when
in the (SC) state, while φC corresponds to the immediate aggregate probability for a
challenger to innovate, whether it be in the (SC) or the (SI) state.
We deﬁne as qi the total transition rate out of state i, and qi,i = −qi.











and the transition probability matrix over time interval ∆t is P(∆t) = I + Q∆t. Finally,
the embedded (discrete time) Markov chain of the continuous time Markov process M(t)





This ends the proof. ￿
Now that we have determined that M(t) is a Markov process, we still need to prove
that it admits a stationary distribution in order to be able to characterize a steady state
for our economy.
Proposition 2: The Markov process M(t), describing the market structure, admits a sta-








Proof : We deﬁne the state probability vector π(t), being a function of time and evolving
as follows: d
dtπ(t) = π(t) · Q. The stationary solution π = limt→∞ π(t) is independant of
13time, and thus satisﬁes π · Q = 0. Being a probability distribution vector, it also satisﬁes






we then have that π · E = e.
Using all those results together, we have that π(Q + E) = e, and hence the stationary
distribution is obtained by solving for π = e · (Q + E)−1, provided Q + E is an invertible
matrix. We have Q + E =
 
1 − φM 1 + φM
1 + φC 1 − φC
 
. This matrix is indeed invertible, with
(Q + E)−1 = 1
−2φC−2φM
 
1 − φC −1 − φM
−1 − φC 1 − φM
 







. This ends the proof. ￿
The steady state equilibrium is hence deﬁned by the overall wealths in both states
ΩM and ΩI, as well as the stationary distribution of M, determined by the endogenous
transition rates φM and φC. As already stated, those transition rates are being determined
by the R&D investment decisions of the incumbent (transition from the (SC) to the (SI)
state) and the challengers (transition from the (SI) to the (SC) state), taken according
to the rewards accruing to successful innovators, πM and πI. Such a structure makes
it impossible to solve separately for the two states (SC) and (SI): indeed, the reward of
innovating a second time in a row (proﬁts πI) is taken into account by the incumbent when
deciding its investment in R&D in the (SC) state, as shown by equation (10).
The equations deﬁning the steady state hence are: the free-entry equality constraint
between expected proﬁts and incurred costs (7), equation (10) stating the relationship
between marginal costs in R&D of the incumbent in the (SC) state and the incremental
gain in its expected value, equations (12) and (13) expressing the expected value of an
innovation in both states as a function of proﬁts, and ﬁnally equations (16) and (17)
describing equilibrium on the labor market in both states. Putting equations (7) and (12)
as well as (10) and (13) together, we are left with the 4 following equations:
wFφα−1
C =












C = πM − rΩM (20)
wFφα
C = πI − rΩI (21)
Proposition 3: In the case the R&D cost function takes the quadratic form ψ(φi) = Fφ2
i
and for (r,k) small enough, the system (18)-(21) has a unique solution in (φC,φM,ΩM,ΩI),
all strictly positive.
Proof: cf Appendix A.
Some comments of Proposition 3 are in order. By introducing the possibility for the
quality leader monopolist having innovated twice to discriminate among consumers having
diﬀerent levels of wealth, we have provided a rationale for the industry leader to overcome
the Arrow (1962) eﬀect and to keep investing in R&D. To the best of our knowledge,
14this result is new in the innovation by incumbent literature. Indeed, the strictly positive
innovation rate of the incumbent in the (SC) state, φM, is here obtained with complete
equal treatment in the R&D ﬁeld between the industry leader and the challengers: we are
not allowing for any R&D cost advantage of the incumbent over the followers (Segerstrom,
2007), nor for any sequentiality in the patent races (Etro, 2008).
Our result demonstrates that the incentive can be found on the demand side (quality
good market structure), and not only on the supply side (R&D sector characteristics and
R&D capabilities of challenger and incumbent ﬁrms). To that respect, our model can be
compared to the one of Aghion et al. (2001), where the perspective to escape competitive
pressure on the product market was driving the incumbent’s investment in R&D. In their
framework however, each industry is assumed to be duopolistic with respect to R&D as well
as production, i.e. only the incumbent monopolist and an outsider participate to patent
races. Our paper on the other hand allows for free entry in the R&D races, and sheds light
on a totally diﬀerent demand-sided motive for innovation by incumbent. Indeed, positive
investment in R&D by the incumbent is not driven by the motive to escape competition,
but solely stems from the positive increment between the two monopolistic proﬁts πM and
πI, i.e. from the possibility to price discriminate.
Such a result, beyond its novelty, enables us furthermore to study the impact of income
inequality on the innovation by incumbent rate, as well as on the overall economic growth
rate. This is the aim of next section.
6 Growth rate and inequality
We now move to studying the impact of income inequality on innovation rates, whether
it be of the challengers or the incumbent. Does a wider group of poor people (increasing
β) or a more equal distribution of overall wealth between rich and poor (increasing d)
increase or lower the innovation rates? We will hence be able to contribute to the existing
literature analyzing the relationship between income inequality and growth, along the
papers of Zweimuller (2000), Li (2003) or Zweimuller and Brunner (2005). As we will see,
the picture obtained once allowing for innovation by incumbent is more complete, and sheds
light on some new mechanisms. We ﬁrst study the eﬀects of inequality on the intensity of
investment in R&D of both incumbents and challengers, before analyzing the eﬀect of such
shocks on the overall growth rate of the economy.
6.1 Wealth distribution and R&D intensity
We ﬁrst start by studying the eﬀect of a positive shock on β on the diﬀerent endogenous
variables in our economy.
Proposition 4: In the case the R&D cost function takes the quadratic form form ψ(φi) =
Fφ2
i and under the parametric conditions allowing for a positive steady state equilibrium





∂β < 0. The overall wealth ΩM in the (SC) state increases along β, while overall
weatlh ΩI in the (SI) state decreases along β: ∂ΩM
∂β > 0 and ∂ΩI
∂β < 0.
Proof: cf Appendix B
We hence have that for a given fraction d of average wealth per capita being attributed
to poor consumers, a higher fraction β of the population being poor is detrimental to the
15rate of innovation of both the incumbent (φM) and the challengers (φC).
The analysis of these results revolves around the eﬀect of an increasing β on the in-
novation rewards vM and vI. We ﬁrst notice that for given ΩM and ΩI, the proﬁts πM
are not impacted by an increase in β, while proﬁts πI are decreasing.12 Such a result
will obviously impact φM, since the increment between proﬁts in the (SC) state and the
(SI) state has decreased: the incumbent will hence have a smaller incentive to invest in
R&D, and for given ΩM and ΩI we have that φM drops. Concerning φC, we simply need
to remember that vM, the reward for innovating once, also includes a part linked to the
beneﬁts associated to entering the “private” R&D race only accessible to the incumbent:
the term (α − 1)wFφ2
M in equation (12). This part of the reward associated to challenger
innovation drops along πI: the incremental gain linked to charging a higher price to the
rich part of the population decreases when the share of those rich people in total population
is diminishing. Hence, φC drops as well for an increasing β.
Concerning the impact of a rising β on ΩM, we consider equation (20), deﬁning the
equilibrium constraint on the labor market in the (SC) state. In the case of an increase
in β, less labor is dedicated to the R&D sector, while the amount being dedicated to the
production of the quality good is ﬁxed at aL (we indeed impose unit consumption for the
quality good). It hence means that the extra labor has been reassigned to the production
of the standard good, implying that more of this good is now consumed. Given that the
consumption of the standard good is independent from β in the (SC) state for a given ΩM
and increasing in ΩM, we hence necessarily have that the overall wealth ΩM has increased.
We hence also have that πM increases, since the latter is not otherwise inﬂuenced by an
increase in β. Concerning ΩI, the intuition is less straightforward. Considering equation
(21) deﬁning the labor equilibrium constraint in the (SI) state, we have that for a given
ΩI, the consumption of the standard good increases along β (since the proﬁts πI asso-
ciated to the sales of the quality good drop for a given level of overall wealth). Given
the fact that φC drops for a rising β, labor is simply being reallocated from the R&D
sector to the production of the standard good. The direction of variation of ΩI is hence
not obvious: proposition 4 states that ΩI decreases along β. Hence, the incremental gain
vI − vM decreases both because of the direct eﬀect of β on πI and the generated eﬀect on
ΩI. The extent of this drop counteracts the increase in πM, that would have gone in the
direction of an increasing φC. The overall eﬀect on φC of an increase in β remains negative.
Hence, in our model, a shift in the population shares impacts the innovation intensity,
and hence the growth rate, even when the equilibrium market structure is a monopoly in
the (SC) state. These results can be compared to the ones obtained in the more general
literature studying the link between innovation and growth on one hand, and to the ones
displayed in Zweimuller and Brunner (2005) on the other hand. In the standard quality-
ladder models (Segerstrom et al., 1990; Aghion and Howitt, 1992), the extent of inequalities
existing in the distribution of a given overall wealth does not impact the R&D rates, since
the presence of homothetic preferences ensures that poorer people will only consume a
smaller quantity of the top quality good.13 In Zweimuller and Brunner (2005), when in
the case of a monopoly in the (SC) state, the size of the population share β being poor
does not inﬂuence the innovation rate. Indeed, R&D is only carried out by challengers,
12Indeed, for a given ΩM we have
∂πM
∂β = 0: in the (SC) state the whole population is being charged the
same price, and hence the shares of poor and rich people do not matter for πM. For a given ΩI on the





13What inﬂuences the equilibrium growth rate however in those models is the size of population L, which
is a well-identiﬁed phenomenon known as the scale eﬀect property. This is however not the eﬀect we have
put forward in our analysis.
16whose only reward for innovating is the proﬁts πM, which are not inﬂuenced by β for a
given level of wealth. In our framework however, challengers also take into account in their
R&D investment decision a second gain linked to becoming quality leader, which is the
possibility to enter the incumbent private R&D race. If the gains linked to this possibility
decrease, which is the case along an increasing β, we hence have that investment in R&D
by both challengers and incumbent is negatively inﬂuenced.
Proposition 5: In the case the R&D cost function takes the quadratic form ψ(φi) = Fφ2
i
and under the parametric conditions allowing for a positive steady state equilibrium to exist,
the challenger R&D intensity increases along d:
∂φC
∂d > 0. The directions of variation of
the incumbent R&D intensity φM as well as the overall wealths ΩM and ΩI in both possible
states are ambiguous.
Proof: cf Appendix B
For given ΩM and ΩI, we have that both πM and πI increase in the case of an increase in
d,14 which in turn unambiguously increases the reward for innovating once vM. Indeed, as
already pointed out concerning our analysis of the eﬀects of a rising β, vM takes into account
both the proﬁts accruing from being a simple monopolist in the (SC) state and the ones
stemming from price discriminating in the (SI) state. Hence, considering equation (18), we
get that investment in R&D by the challenger φC increases following this increase in the
expected reward. Alternatively, one could have considered the labor market equilibrium
constraint (21): we have that since for a given ΩI proﬁts πI have increased, less labor
is being used to produce the standard good, and the freed workers are reallocated to the
R&D sector, thus increasing φC.
Concerning φM, Proposition 5 states that the direction of its variation is ambiguous.
This should not come as a surprise, considering that increasing πM and πI do not determine
the sign of the variation of the increment between πM and πI. Indeed, for given ΩI and




k2 , whose sign is ambiguous. We however
notice that the increment has higher chances to increase for small values of β and k. As
far as ΩM and ΩI are concerned, their variation is ambiguous as well, as it can be seen
from equations (20) and (21). Indeed, considering equation (21) and since the direct eﬀect
of d on πI for a given ΩI is positive, φC can still increase along d even if ΩI decreases. The
extent of this decrease cannot however be strong enough to overcome the initial increase
in πI, otherwise φC would decrease, which is not possible along Proposition 5. Concerning
ΩM, the ambiguous direction of variation of φM makes the analysis even more diﬃcult.
Hence, we have that the eﬀect of a redistribution of wealth from the rich to the poor
consumers is always beneﬁcial to the innovation rate φC, while it has ambiguous eﬀects on
the incumbent innovation rate φM. As a whole, we can conclude that diminishing income
inequalities are beneﬁcial for the overall economic growth rate, that we now deﬁne.
6.2 Utility and economic growth rate
Our model displays neither capital accumulation nor productivity improvements. How-
ever, consumers become better oﬀ due to the successive quality improvements of the quality
consumption good.









17Proposition 6: The steady state utility growth rate of our economy is γ = (lnk)φC(1 +
φM
φM+φC).
Proof : Considering equation (2) and the fact that in a given state, the consumption of





qi(t). In state (SC), we hence have that γR =
˙ qR(t)
qR(t) = (lnk)(φC + φM) and
γP =
˙ qP(t)
qP(t) = (lnk)(φC). Indeed, if the next innovation race is won by a challenger, the
latter will sell to both population groups the unique quality he has at its disposal, hav-
ing a quality increment k with respect to the previous quality being consumed by both
groups. However, if the next innovation race is won by the incumbent, the latter will
sell the highest quality he has at its disposal to the rich consumers, whose utility will
indeed increase. He will however keep selling the second-best quality to the poor con-
sumers, whose utility will hence not increase following this quality jump. In state (SI),
only challengers carry out R&D, and in the case they win the next innovation race, they
will again sell the highest quality to the two groups of consumers. Hence we have that
γR = (lnk)φC, while γP = 2(lnk)φC. Indeed, the poor consumers were consuming quality
q−1 before the quality jump. Hence, considering the stationary probability distribution of
the market structure, we have that the average utility growth rate of rich consumers is
γR = (lnk)((φC + φM)(
φC
φC+φM ) + φC(
φM
φC+φM )) = (lnk)φC(1 +
φM
φM+φC), while the average
utility growth rate of poor consumers is γP = (lnk)φC(
φC





φM+φC). This ends the proof. ￿
This result can be commented in the light of the literature analyzing price discrimi-
nation by a monopolist having at its disposal a product range including diﬀerent quality
levels. The seminal paper in this literature is Mussa and Rosen (1978), in which it is
demonstrated that serving costumers who place smaller valuations on quality creates neg-
ative externalities for the monopolist, that limit the possibilities for capturing costumer
surplus from those who have a higher valuation for quality. In their set-up, the monopolist
does have access to a whole product line: he then internalizes the negative externalities by
inducing less enthusiastic consumers to buy lower quality items charged at a lower price,
opening the possibility of charging higher prices to more adamant buyers of high quality
units.
In our model however, the monopolist only has access to as many qualities as R&D races
he has won. The negative externalities stemming from having to serve two distinct groups
of consumers having diﬀerent quality valuation is then internalized by expanding the line
of product towards higher qualities (and not lower qualities as in Mussa and Rosen (1978)),
i.e. through R&D investment. Indeed, innovating once more and having at its disposal
two successive qualities enables the monopolist to discriminate between rich consumers
and poor consumers by oﬀering two diﬀerent price-quality bundles. Proposition 6 shows
that such a mechanism is in favor of a higher global innovation rate, since innovation by
incumbent adds itself to the traditional innovation by challengers, which is beneﬁcial for
the economy as a whole.
However, the inequalities that are at the root of such a higher incentive to innovate
still make the beneﬁts of the innovation process unevenly spread following certain quality
jumps. Indeed, in the case the incumbent wins the next innovation race, the poor con-
sumers will not enjoy the new top quality: hence, in our model as in the model of Mussa and
Rosen (1978), more than the optimal number of qualities for consumers survive, but only
when in the (SI) state. The average steady state growth rate is then the same for the rich
18and poor consumers’ utility, but only because when switching back to the (SC) state, the
increment in quality for the poor consumers is twice as big as the one for the rich consumers.
We have hence demonstrated the existence of a steady state equilibrium with positive
investment of the incumbent in R&D races, and analyzed the various eﬀects of income
inequality on the growth characteristics of our model. We have however so far restricted
ourselves to the case where the market structure in the (SC) state is a monopoly, arguing
that this case would necessarily occur for β and d suﬃciently close to 1. We will now
complete the picture and deﬁne as well the steady state equilibrium in the case where the
market structure in the (SC) case turns out to be a duopoly, in order to check that we
indeed have cases where we have πM > πR
D.
7 Duopoly in the (SC) state
We now deﬁne the steady state equilibrium equations in the case we have a duopoly
market structure in the (SC) state.
R&D sector. The costs of conducting R&D remain the same. However, as we have
already stated, investment decisions in R&D are taken not only considering the associated
costs, but also the rewards in the case of a successful innovation. Since those ones are
diﬀerent if the market structure in the (SC) case is a duopoly, we need to redeﬁne them.
We now deﬁne as vD the expected present value of the quality leader in the (SC) state, and
vI as the expected present value of a quality leader having innovated twice in the (SI) state.
vCD,i and vCI,i are the associated expected present values of a challenger ﬁrm i. Again,
free entry in the R&D races implies that we have vCD,i = vCI,i = 0. Equality between
expected proﬁts and engaged costs for the challengers yields the two following equalities,









Hence, considering equation (24) we get again the result that the innovation rate by chal-
lenger is the same in states (SC) and (SI). From now on we will refer to this common rate
as φCD. The two Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations in respectively the (SC) and (SI)








I + φI(vI − vI) + φCD(vF − vI)} (26)
Indeed, the incumbent in the (SC) state now earns the proﬁts πR
D, capturing only the up-
per part of the quality good market, and incurs the R&D costs wFφα
D. The incumbent in
the (SI) state still earns the proﬁts πI of a monopolist being able to discriminate between
rich and poor consumers by oﬀering two distinct price/quantity bundles. A new value
vF is introduced: it corresponds to the expected present value of the second-best quality
19seller, having a positive market share in the duopoly case of the (SC) state. This expected
present value is equal to the proﬁts made by the second-best quality seller, corrected by
the immediate probability to be driven out of the market by either a successful incumbent




In both states, the incumbent ﬁrm chooses its R&D eﬀort so as to maximize the right-
hand side of its Bellman equation. Using the fact that vCD,i = vCI,i = 0, equations (25)
and (26) then yield the following ﬁrst order conditions:
vI − vD = αwFφα−1
D (27)
−αwFφα−1
I = 0 ⇒ φI = 0 (28)
Using the optimality constraints (27) and (28) in (25) and (26), we obtain the following
expressions for the expected values vD and vI:
vD =
πR








Hence, compared to the case where the market structure in the (SC) state is a monopoly,
we here have a further term on the RHS of the equalities (corresponding to the expected
proﬁts): the perspective of still having a positive market share as the second-best quality
producer. As pointed out by Zweimuller and Brunner (2005), the eﬀect on the R&D in-
vestment is not obvious.
Labor market. The two equations describing the equilibrium on the labor market in
respectively the (SC) and the (SI) state are now of the form:
L = Fφα
D + Fφα
CD + aL + (L/w)(β(yP
D − pP




CD + aL + (L/w)(β(yP
I − pP
I ) + (1 − β)(yR
I − pR
I )) (32)
Again, it proves convenient to express (29) and (30) in terms of proﬁt ﬂows in both
states, i.e. in terms of πP
D, πR





I by their values expressed in Section 3, splitting waL into βwaL+(1−β)waL and





D − rΩD (33)
wFφα
CD = πI − rΩI (34)
Stochastic long-run equilibrium. Propositions 1 and 2 can be reformulated the following
way in the duopoly case:
Proposition 7: In the case the equilibrium market structure is a duopoly in the (SI)
state, the market structure M(t) is a Markov process with state space {(SC),(SI)}, tran-





, and transition probability matrix PD(∆t) =








The 4 endogenous variables describing the steady state equilibrium are now the inno-
vation rates φD and φCD, as well as the overall wealth ΩD in the (SC) state and ΩI in the
























D − rΩD (37)
wFφα
CD = πI − rΩI (38)
Those expressions unfortunately make any analytical result concerning the existence
and uniqueness of a steady state equilibrium with (φCD,φD,ΩD,ΩI) all strictly positive
hard to deﬁne. Indeed, even with quadratic R&D costs of the form ψ(φi) = Fφ2
i, the




r+φD+φCD, expressing the fact that an incumbent that has lost its quality
leadership gets anyway to survive during one more innovative race, selling quality q−1 to
the group of poor consumers.
Hence, providing results concerning the existence of a steady state equilibrium and the
various eﬀect of income inequalities on growth could only be done through simulations in
the case the equilibrium market structure is a duopoly in the (SC) state, and without any
rigorous analytical result. Since the aim of our paper was to shed light on a new mechanism
possibly driving a positive investment in R&D by the incumbent, which has analytically
been done in the dominant case of a monopoly market structure in the (SC) state, we
hence stop our analysis here.
We however need to check that the duopoly case is not the dominant one, i.e. that there
are indeed parametric cases for which we have πM > πR
D. We hence proceed to simulations
in the case of R&D quadratic costs. As already stated, the decisive parameters that will
determine the equilibrium market structure in the (SC) state are d and β, deﬁning the
extent of inequalities in the wealth distribution. We hence focus on the eﬀects of diﬀerent
values taken by those parameters on πM −πR
D, and check whether this diﬀerence is positive
for some parametric cases.
We hence proceed to simulations for β varying from 0,3 to 1 and d varying from 0,1
to 1. We also proceed to a sensitivity analysis along diﬀerent values of F, k, a and r. Our
numerical ﬁndings are the following:
Numerical ﬁnding 1: under a wide array of parametric cases, it is indeed possible to obtain
a positive equilibrium for both the monopoly and duopoly cases.
Numerical ﬁnding 2: for almost every value of β and d for which a positive steady state
equilibrium indeed exists, we have πM > πR
D, making Propositions 4 to 6 valid for a wide
array of parametric cases.
21Figure 1: Proﬁts πM and πR
D in the (SC) state for β varying from 0,3 to 0,9









Dashed line: proﬁts πR
D, Full line: proﬁts πM. Values for the other parameters: r = 0,1, L = 200, a = 0,1, F = 50,
d = 0,5, w = 10, k = 1,1
Indeed, we ﬁnd that if the duopoly case occurs, it is never for higher values of β than
0,4. For a given β, varying values of d only matter in the sign of πM − πR
D for very
high values of a (a > 0,9). Otherwise, for any wealth repartition between poor and rich
consumers, it is the share of each population group that will determine the dominant case
in the (SC) state. Hence, as soon as the share of poor people in the overall population is
equal or superior to 1/2 and under the parametric conditions for which a positive steady
state equilibrium exists, the equilibrium market structure in the (SC) state is a monopoly.
8 Conclusion
Our paper has presented a new, demand-driven rationale for innovation by incumbents.
By allowing, through the feature of non-homothetic preferences, for the possibility of price
discrimination of consumers having diﬀerent levels of wealth, we have provided a suﬃcient
incentive for the industry leader to overcome the Arrow (1962) eﬀect and keep investing in
R&D. The strictly positive innovation rate of the incumbent is here obtained without any
advantage of the incumbent in the R&D ﬁeld (supply side), but through income inequalities
and the generated diﬀerent quality valuation of poor and rich consumers (demand side).
Beyond its novelty, this framework has also allowed us to analyze the eﬀect of the extent
of income inequalities on both the challenger and incumbent innovation rates, and hence
on the growth rate of our economy. We have demonstrated that a higher share of the
population being poor is detrimental to the rate of economic growth. A redistribution
of wealth from rich to poor consumers is on the other hand beneﬁcial for the challenger
innovation rate, while it has ambiguous eﬀects on the incumbent innovation rate.
A possible objection to our results would be that although positive, the incumbent
R&D rate we obtain is in most simulated cases signiﬁcantly lower than the challenger
R&D rate. Such results are at odds with the ones of Etro (2008), that has found that
patentholders carry out a major bulk of the overall R&D investment. However, our aim
in this paper was to isolate a possible demand-driven incentive for incumbents to invest in
22R&D, which is not incompatible at all with other mechanisms put forward in papers such
as the ones of Segerstrom (2007), Etro (2008) or Aghion et al. (2001). Indeed, the fact
that incumbents behave as Stackelberg leaders or have an advantage in the R&D process
seems highly probable to us.
Some lines of further work can be quickly sketched. An obvious extension to our model
would be to treat the more general case of more than two types of consumers, in order
for the incumbent to keep investing in R&D after the second successful race.15 A model
such as ours can also be extended to a two-country framework, in order to contribute to
the developing literature studying the role of multi-product ﬁrms in international trade
(Brambilla, 2009; Fajgelbaum et al., 2009): an increasing β could then be perceived as a
globalization shock, and one could study its eﬀects on the contribution of quality leaders
to the economic growth rate. Finally, our modeling approach can also prove itself a useful
tool in the durable good literature: it can be considered as a way of endogenizing the R&D
decision of the seller of a durable good (Fischman and Rob, 2000; Nahm, 2004).
15Indeed, as already pointed out, the null investment in R&D by the incumbent in the (SI) state solely
stems from the fact that we have only two distinct groups of consumers: once having oﬀered two distinct
price-quality bundles, the incumbent does not have any incentive to keep carrying out R&D.
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In order to ease up notations in the rest of the proof, we deﬁne the following terms:

















r(k + (1 − β)d).
Considering the stationarized steady state Markovian equilibrium deﬁned by equations
(18) to (21), it is possible to express ΩM and ΩI as functions of φI and φM using equations










Substituting back in equations (18) and (19), the equilibrium is now deﬁned by the two
following equations:
















Rearranging the terms, we deﬁne two equations G(φM,φC) = 0 and H(φM,φC) = 0


























C + 2FwφCφM + 2FwrφM = 0








(k + (1−β)d)) > 0 for















= Frw + 2
Frw
r − D
+ 2wFφM > 0
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∂φM
= 2wFφC + 2wFr > 0















> 0 for φM,φC > 0












< 0 for φM,φC > 0
Hence, provided those two curves intersect in the plane (φM,φC) for φM > 0 and φC > 0,
it will be a unique intersection. We have established that if a positive equilibrium exists, it
is unique.
We now are left to prove that those two curves indeed intersect for φM,φC > 0, and
that for those values taken by φC and φM we have positive corresponding values for ΩM
and ΩI. We hence need to establish that:
1. Under certain parametric conditions, the φM for which G(φM,0) = 0 is inferior to
the solution to H(φM,0) = 0,
2. Under certain compatible parametric conditions, the φC for which G(0,φC) = 0 is
inferior to the solution to H(0,φC) = 0.








C ⇐⇒ φC =
















C ⇐⇒ φC =









































(Frw(r − D))2 + 4FwCr2 −
 
(Frw(r − B))2 + 4FwAr2
We have r < 1, and for r small enough the terms 4FwCr2 and 4FwAr2 dominate the terms

































We are now left to determine the sign of ΩM and ΩI under those parametric condi-




C. Given the fact we are not able to analytically solve for the values of φC and
φM, the sign of those expressions is a priori ambiguous. Those expressions will however
be positive if φC and φM, which are the immediate probabilities of innovating of the chal-
lengers and the incumbent, are small enough. We know that investment in R&D decreases
along k. Indeed, k denotes the quality increment when successfully innovating: a smaller k
decreases the incentives to invest in R&D, which in turn decreases the immediate probabil-
ity to successfully innovate. As k becomes closer to 1, φC and φM will decrease: wFφ2
C and
wFφ2
M hence become negligible compared to (k−1
k )(1−a)wL, since we assumed that L > F.
We have hence demonstrated that for (r,k) small enough, there exists a unique, positive
equilibrium to the system (18)-(21) in (φC,φM,ΩM,ΩI), all strictly positive.
10 Appendix B
10.1 Comparative statics with respect to β

















































































wk(k − 1)((1 − a)(1 + d(k − 1))L − dFkφ2
C)
(k − d(k − 1)(1 − β))2










are left to study the sign of ∂H
∂β , which itself depends on the sign of (1−a)(1−d+dk)L−
dFkφ2
C. According to the labor market equilibrium condition, we know that we necessarily
have (1 − a)L > Fφ2
C (i.e. the available labor force once having taken out the aL fraction
devoted to the production of the quality good is strictly superior to the amount of labor
hired by the challengers to carry out R&D if we have a strictly positive investment in
R&D by the incumbent). It hence follows that we have (1 − a)(1 − d + dk)L − dkFφ2
C >
dk(1 − a)L − dkFφ2
C > 0. We hence have that ∂H
∂β > 0.
Considering the signs deﬁned in Appendix A, we can then conclude that
∂φM
∂β < 0 and
∂φC
∂β < 0.
Direction of variation of ΩM. Considering equation (20), i.e. the labor market equi-
librium constraint in the (SC) state, we see that the left-hand side decreases following a
positive shock on β. β does not appear on the right-hand side of this equation, which is
decreasing along ΩM. Hence, in order to re-establish the equality, ΩM needs to increase:
∂ΩM
∂β > 0.










C). The second term is negative, while the
sign of the ﬁrst term depends on the sign of −k−1
k2 (1 − a)wL − 2wFφC
∂φC
∂β     
<0
. Considering
the detailed expression obtained for
∂φC
∂β , we have that the second term of this diﬀerence
is negligible, which means that the whole expression is negative. We hence obtain that
∂ΩI
∂β < 0.
10.2 Comparative statics with respect to d
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(k − 1)w(1 − β)(Fk2φ2
C − (1 − a)(k − 1)L(k + 1 − β))
(k − d(k − 1)(1 − β))2
27The sign of those two derivatives is necessarily negative when in the parameter conditions
allowing for a strictly positive solution to the system (18)-(21). Indeed, ΩM > 0 implies
that (k−1)(1−a)wL−wF(φ2
M +φ2
C) > 0 and (k−1)(k+1−β)(1−a)wL−wk2Fφ2
C > 0.
We then unambiguously have
∂φC
∂d > 0. The sign of
∂φM
∂d is however ambiguous, and
depends on the relative size of − ∂H
∂φC
∂G




The sign of the variations of ΩI and ΩM is ambiguous as well. For given φM and φC,
we have that both ΩM and ΩI increase along d, since the numerator of their expression
obtained in Appendix A decreases. However, the fact that
∂φC
∂d > 0 counteracts this direct
increase. The overall variation of ΩI depends on the relative strength of those two eﬀects.













r(1 − β)(C − wFφ2
C)
      
>0
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